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 HALLOWS LECTURE 
 
MARQUETTE UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL 
APRIL 14, 2009 
 
BEYOND DECISIONAL TEMPLATES: 
THE ROLE OF IMAGINATIVE JUSTICE IN 
THE TRIAL COURT 
THE HONORABLE SARAH EVANS BARKER

 
Introduction by Dean Joseph D. Kearney 
It is my privilege as dean to welcome you to our annual Hallows Lecture.  This 
lecture stands in memory of E. Harold Hallows, a member of the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court from 1958 to 1974 (and chief justice during the final six of those years).  That is 
an impressive run on a state supreme court.  But it is not all that moved the Law School 
to create this lecture.  For E. Harold Hallows was, for an even much longer time, a 
professor here at Marquette University Law School.  For twenty-eight years—from 
1930, the year he graduated from the University of Chicago Law School, to 1958, the 
year he was appointed to the court, he was Professor Hallows.  Professor Hallows 
taught a generation of Marquette law students courses such as Equity and Equity II, 
even as he practiced law in Milwaukee and helped to lead various law-reform efforts.  
In short, E. Harold Hallows was a practitioner and a professor, of energy and 
distinction, even before his service as a justice. 
How appropriate, then, that more than a decade ago the Law School determined 
to create an annual opportunity, in Chief Justice Hallows’s memory, for a distinguished 
jurist to spend a day or two within the Law School community today.  Truly the Hallows 
Lecture is a centerpiece of our academic year.  I am especially pleased that two of the 
Hallows Lecturers during my time as dean have elected to join us this afternoon for this 
year’s lecture: Chief Justice Shirley Abrahamson, fresh off her reelection to the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court, and Judge Diane Sykes, of our Class of 1984, who, as a 
member of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, must deeply 
regret that she has deprived herself of a similar opportunity to stand in further judicial 
elections. 
Over the years the Hallows Lecture has thus included individuals of different 
judicial philosophies, state and federal judges, men and women, alumni and non-
alumni.  What it has not previously included is an individual who has made his (or her) 
career primarily as a trial judge.   
 
 District Judge, United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. 
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Today we correct that historical oversight, in spectacular fashion, with the visit—
and Hallows Lecture—of the Honorable Sarah Evans Barker, United States District 
Judge for the Southern District of Indiana.  Judge Barker holds her undergraduate 
degree from Indiana University and her law degree from American Univers ity’s 
Washington College of Law.  She had a distinguished law practice in her native 
Indiana, serving variously as an assistant United States Attorney, a lawyer in private 
practice, and then the United States Attorney for the Southern District of Indiana.  She 
was nominated to her current position by President Ronald Reagan in 1984 and 
confirmed by the United States Senate in short order, twenty-five years (and one month) 
ago to this day.   
To state the matter simply, over the past quarter-century, Judge Barker has 
become one of the nation’s most highly regarded federal district judges.  She has 
presided in numerous high-profile cases, from the constitutional challenge in the 1980s 
brought by the American Booksellers Association and others against Indianapo lis’s 
ordinance directed at pornography, to, more recently, class-action litigation involving 
Bridgestone and Firestone tires, to, more recently still, the constitutional challenge to 
Indiana’s voter-identification law.  In the last of these matters, Judge Barker’s ruling 
was upheld by the Seventh Circuit and then, last year, by the United States Supreme 
Court, with Justice Stevens citing Judge Barker’s “comprehensive . . . opinion.”  
There is so much more that could be noted about Judge Barker’s judicial service, 
from her past tenure as Chief Judge of the Southern District of Indiana to her 
leadership of her peers as the current president of the Federal Judges Association.  But 
I wish to stand down, in favor of our hearing from a woman who has been—who is—an 
outstanding judge and who does us a great honor by coming to Milwaukee to deliver 
Marquette University Law School’s Hallows Lecture.  Please join me in welcoming the 
Honorable Sarah Evans Barker. 
 
I am delighted to be here this afternoon on this auspicious occasion and to 
see, among members of the faculty and more than a few students, so many 
judicial colleagues and friends dotted around this impressively large audience.  
Thank you all for coming.  I am particularly grateful for Dean Kearney‘s 
generous and kind words of introduction.  His effusions remind me of the 
familiar quip made years ago by Mae West, who said that ―sometimes too 
much of a good thing is wonderful.‖ 
The Dean‘s introduction also put me in mind of a recent criminal trial, 
where I was presiding, which involved a brand-new, fledgling defense lawyer 
who was clearly appearing in her very first trial.  That fact was made even 
more conspicuous by her careful effort to use just the right words for 
everything.  Thus, in her cross examination of the government‘s witnesses and 
in her statements to me up at the bench, she always referred to her client as 
the ―alleged defendant.‖  Well, that gaffe was not lost on my crackerjack law 
clerks, so, during one of the early recesses in the proceedings, they asked, 
―Did you notice that, Judge—that she was referring to the defendant as the 
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alleged defendant?‖  I allowed as how I had, indeed, noticed that same thing.  
Whereupon, the law clerks asked, ―Are you going to correct her, Judge?‖ And 
I said, ―No, but if she starts referring to me as the ‗alleged Judge,‘ I might 
have to intervene.‖  So I regard it as an altogether fine introduction if I am 
simply not referred to as an alleged something or another.  I thank you, Dean, 
especially for that. 
Allow me to remark as well on the great honor that I feel in having been 
invited to deliver this prestigious Hallows Lecture, knowing particularly that I 
follow in the footsteps of several truly extraordinary jurists who also have 
been accorded this privilege.  When I learned that Justice Hallows, when he 
was a professor here at Marquette Law School, had taught Equity, I felt a 
special connection to him, since, when I was in law school, the only course in 
which I managed to pull down the top grade in the class was Equity.  I 
thought at the time that I had a distinct advantage in terms of doing well in 
that class, since I had grown up in a family in northern Indiana where I was 
one of six children—which meant there was a lot of equity dispensed by my 
parents around the dinner table and elsewhere in getting us all raised properly.  
It is probably true that my mother deserved that award more than I did.  In any 
event, this lectureship, which was endowed in Professor Hallows‘s name, has 
a rich tradition associated with it, and it is both my pleasure and my honor 
now to be a part of that tradition and that history. 
Recently, Judge Richard Posner wrote what has already become a widely 
read and highly acclaimed book (I describe it that way not just because he is 
on our court of appeals and reviews my decisions on occasion).  That book is 
entitled How Judges Think.
1
  It begins with the observation that there are 
pervasive, often unrealistic conceptions among the public, including even 
members of the legal profession within the legal academy, with regard to what 
judges do and, in particular, how they decide their cases.
2
  This widespread 
lack of clarity, Judge Posner explains, emanates from many sources.  Part of 
the problem is that the issues before the courts, as well as the language we use 
in deciding the issues, are often both arcane and esoteric.  In addition, the 
decisional process tends to be cloaked in secrecy.  It doesn‘t help that judges 
as a group also tend to be coy and a bit cagey about what we do, Judge Posner 
admits.
3
  Furthermore when decisions are ―handed down,‖ they come without 
even a hint of the public relations, spokespersons, and spin that we now 
expect from all other fields of public endeavor.  Instead, judicial decisions just 
arrive, naked and unarmed, like a new baby.  They are accompanied by no 
explanatory press releases, and there are no appearances on the Sunday 
 
1. RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK (2008). 
2. Id. at 2. 
3. Id. 
670 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [92:667 
morning talk shows from the deciding judges to explain exactly what was 
going on and why the particular decision got made.  No surprise, then, that it 
is difficult for outsiders to know what happened during the decisional process.  
Sometimes it‘s even difficult for judges to fathom another judge‘s decisional 
process (and I say that kindly).  So Judge Posner‘s book is an impressive and, 
I think, welcome effort to shed some light on what is really going on here. 
Now, most people assume and properly expect that judges play by the 
rules of the judicial process—we interpret statutes and the Constitution as 
faithfully as we possibly can, according to our understanding of them; we 
follow decisional precedent fairly and closely; we issue our decisions together 
with carefully articulated, reasoned analyses; we operate within the procedural 
boundaries; and we hew closely to the ethical guidelines.  Most of the time, 
most judges do all these things.  By faithfully following these rules of the road 
in decision-making, judges also accomplish two added goals: they give 
predictability to the law, and they endow it as well with stability.  Indeed, the 
issue of whether a newly selected judicial nominee can and will stay within 
established legal boundaries is one of the primary concerns that U.S. senators 
have when they conduct their confirmation hearings on the President‘s 
judicial nominees.  One of the strongest criticisms leveled at judges arises 
from the perception that certain judges and certain judicial decisions have 
exceeded the boundaries of accepted, proper, analytical constraints.  Disregard 
of those constraints is, of course, what gets referred to as ―judicial activism,‖ 
and no one I have ever run into or read about thinks it‘s a good thing. 
Judging in accordance with the applicable rules matters; it matters a lot, 
and not just to judges.  There is a healthy, legitimate, valuable skepticism that 
runs against the notion of allowing judges to operate solely on the basis of 
their own discretion and their own sense of what a proper outcome should be 
in any particular case, even when judges are really smart and really sincere 
and really acting in good faith.  I know for a fact that most judges work hard 
to fulfill our oath to uphold and defend the Constitution and to do equal 
justice to the rich and poor, and so forth, and the entire judiciary devotes no 
small amounts of time and energy to figuring out what the controlling facts 
are in any given case and what the rules of law are and how they must be 
woven together into a just outcome. 
That said, there come times when in certain cases and under certain 
circumstances, a literal, rigid adherence to these interpretive rules yields 
absurd results, and in such situations, Judge Posner will tell you, judges are, in 
fact, compelled to make, rather than merely apply, the appropriate rules of 
law.  That, briefly stated, is Judge Posner‘s central thesis.  In such situations, 
he writes, judges are not only permitted to act as legislators, they are required 
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to do so.
4
  To quote him: ―A combination of structural and cultural factors 
imposes a legislative role on our judges that they cannot escape.‖5  ―What 
looks to the critics of the judiciary like willfulness might actually be the good-
faith performance of a vital judicial role . . . .‖6 
Judge Posner coins the term ―legalists‖ to describe judges whose 
inflexibility prevents them from seeing that it sometimes becomes necessary 
to legislate from the bench, to exercise broad discretion, to make new legal 
policy, and to look outside conventional legal texts—statutes, constitutional 
provisions, and precedent—for other helpful analytical tools.7  ―For legalists,‖ 
he writes, ―the law is an autonomous domain of knowledge and technique.‖8 
Now I have said earlier that ―judicial activism‖ in the sense of simply 
abandoning the accepted constraints is felt by everyone to be a bad thing.  
Whether the territory explored by Judge Posner falls into that kind of 
disreputable and, indeed, dangerous activism is, however, quite another 
question, and that question I do not propose to address directly today.  I want 
today to set aside the debate over whether judicial activism is ever a good 
thing or whether it is ever, under any circumstances, constitutionally proper or 
permissible for judges to act as legislators when they decide certain kinds of 
cases.  For now, let‘s just drill in Judge Posner‘s territory and in doing so 
provisionally accept a part of his premise.  Let‘s accept the proposition that, at 
least on occasion, and in at least some cases, applying the established rules 
and procedures does not yield a workable, pragmatic, just outcome, and that 
there are some cases in which the ordinary analytical and decisional templates 
simply don‘t work. 
When judges are confronted with such situations, Judge Posner posits that 
―an open area‖ is created: a gap or an analytical space occurs where the usual 
decisional methods fail to yield a sufficiently nuanced, flexible, workable, and 
just result, and when judges find themselves needing to operate within this 
space, he goes on to say, they are both intellectually and legally allowed to 
exercise a broad form of ―decisional discretion—a blank slate on which to 
inscribe their decisions—rather than being compelled to a particular decision 
by ‗the law.‘‖9  Judge Posner‘s book is, of course, provocative, and whether 
he is right in finding a theoretical basis for full discretion here will, as I said, 
be debated.  But at a minimum I think he is correct in identifying the 
phenomenon of ―open space‖ and then in saying this: ―How [judges] fill in the 
 
4. Id. at 372. 
5. Id. at 4. 
6. Id. 
7. Id. at 7–8. 
8. Id. at 8. 
9. Id. at 9. 
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open area is the fundamental question.‖10  For that issue—what, in fact, 
happens in the ―open area‖—is what I want to take up in these remarks.  I, 
too, perceive that these decisional gaps or spaces do, in fact, occur and that, in 
fact, it is not always clear how to fill them.  So, my hope today is to throw 
some light on how federal district court judges, in contrast to Judge Posner‘s 
focus on the appellate courts, from time to time also find themselves operating 
within this decisional space—this space in which something more is required 
of them as trial judges than a rigid or even strict adherence to the established 
rules and procedures. 
Trial judges, I think more even than appellate judges, are not infrequently 
drawn into areas where something more is required in terms of their 
involvement and decision-making than the explicit dictates of statutes, 
procedural rules, and precedent would suggest.  However, in the trial court, 
that ―something more‖ is less a need for judicial legislation than it is a 
demand for what we might call ―judicial imagination.‖  And this demand for 
―judicial imagination‖ on the part of trial judges manifests itself more as a 
matter of trying to arrive at the best strategies for resolving particular cases 
than it does as an exercise in making the legal rulings that crop up in those 
cases. 
So this is what I would like to help you see more clearly: the amount of 
strategic discretion vested in trial judges which translates into opportunities 
for them to use their judicial imaginations is very extensive.  In fact, in 
exercising—perhaps I should say, in enacting—that imagination, what trial 
court judges are able to do vastly exceeds the creative opportunities available 
to appellate judges.  The flexibility allowed appellate judges is primarily in 
the form of decisional discretion, by which appellate judges are able to give 
broad play to their intellectual and analytical capacities.  Appellate activism 
typically receives much closer scrutiny and generates more disapproval by the 
public and the media as well as the legal academy than does the less visible, 
strategic discretion entrusted to trial judges.  But in truth, discretion and 
power are hardly less significant or influential or creative when applied by 
―the lower courts.‖  In fact, it might be said that it is in these ―lower courts‖ 
that the most interesting and most creative, indeed, the most imaginative 
activity actually occurs.  That might especially be said, with perfect 
objectivity, of course, by a ―lower court‖ judge like myself, and the most 
brilliant appellate judges would, no doubt, affirm that opinion as well. 
Before moving into a closer look at what I shall refer to as ―imaginative 
justice‖ in the trial court, I should emphasize this: for judges, operating within 
this decisional space is absolutely, clearly, the exception and not the rule.  
 
10. Id. 
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Most cases filed in the trial courts, as well as the appellate courts, are routine 
squabbles for which the routine analytical and decisional approaches work 
just fine.  The facts underlying each dispute are developed and stabilized, the 
appropriate procedural steps are followed, the controlling precedents are 
articulated and applied, and decisions are rendered.  This tried-and-true 
approach is appropriately applied in most cases and most situations 
confronting the trial court judge, and, frankly, there are simply too many cases 
on our respective dockets to give anything other than routine attention to most 
of them. 
So where and how does the need for this ―something more‖ present itself?  
Judges are called upon to use their imaginations primarily in the non-routine 
situations where there is a strong need to devise solutions that more closely 
respond, first, to the real nature of the problems the parties have placed before 
them and, second, to the real goals which brought the parties to court.  These 
are typically cases in which the law is either too limited in its reach or doesn‘t 
match the need for a solution.  And the underlying ―Catch-22,‖ of course, lies 
in the nature of courts as opposed to the nature of legislative bodies.  The 
legislature can refuse to act: it‘s too hard and too complicated, they can say; 
when they don‘t have the votes, they can say, ―Come back again in ten years, 
if you‘re still alive.‖  But the courts can‘t take a pass: if a judge refuses to 
resolve a case, no matter the incomplete state of the applicable law, it‘s time 
for disciplinary action against the judge. 
So, judges are typically required to act, and in fulfilling that requirement, 
at the trial level, their role is, of course, to find honest facts and to apply the 
applicable law to resolve cases that arise under the Constitution and acts of 
Congress.  To perform these tasks, trial judges sometimes become involved in 
the cases even before an initial pleading is filed.  That can happen, for 
example, in certain criminal cases where prosecutors seek legal protections to 
obtain and preserve evidence or want search warrants, wiretaps, grand-jury 
subpoenas, and the like, and it can happen in civil cases when expedited pre-
complaint discovery is sought.  So trial judges are required to begin 
shepherding their cases from the very earliest stages and on through what can 
turn into very protracted and complex discovery processes.  All sorts of 
motions are generated along the way that require judicial rulings, and only 
eventually, often after many months and sometimes years, is a final resolution 
hammered out, either by a trial or by settlement or in criminal cases by plea 
agreements. 
Even such a brief overview as this reminds us of the many ways in which 
judges must intervene to manage and expedite the disputes before them—
which is to say, it pushes into the foreground the existence of a large 
operating space.  The fact that cases are often highly complex, that they 
involve complicated and difficult underlying factual controversies concerning 
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which the law is anything but clear, and that they also involve multiple parties 
located everywhere between Bangor and Honolulu, and sometimes throughout 
the rest of the world as well, explains why so often these cases linger so long 
on our dockets.  Trial judges wind up literally living with these cases during 
the many months they repose with us, a fact which, among other things, 
allows us to become well acquainted with the parties as well as their lawyers. 
In addition, there are huge numbers of cases that get filed with us each 
year—lots and lots of cases.  Truly, there is no shortage of judicial business.  
In fact, almost every federal district court judge I know must work on tiptoes 
in order to keep up with the flow.  At any given time on my own docket, for 
example, I carry approximately 500 civil and another 75 criminal cases.  
Recent calculations show that, nationally, trial judges alone dispose of some 
98% of the 35 million cases that are resolved by both federal and state courts 
combined.
11
  The Administrative Office of U.S. Courts recently released 
caseload statistics for the federal courts for 2008, which indicate that nearly a 
quarter of a million civil cases (just the civil cases) were filed last year in the 
federal district courts, one-eighth of which wound up going in due course up 
to courts of appeals.
12
  To handle that quarter of a million civil cases, plus all 
the criminal cases with their Speedy Trial Act requirements, there are a total 
of 678 federal district court judgeships (and a total of 975 judges, including 
senior judges).
13
  So trial judges in the federal system are not sitting around 
twiddling their thumbs. 
Now, even though what I have said so far is already known to most of 
you, it nonetheless helps explain the environment in which judges operate.  
When they are confronted with a need or an opportunity to move out of the 
box, they can do one of two things: either help construct a practical path that 
will lead the parties themselves to resolve their dispute or, failing that, craft a 
legal result that is also practical and workable from everyone‘s standpoint.  
Those prosaic qualities of practicality and workability are very important, 
because it is through them that the parties perceive the legal system to be fair 
and therefore legitimate.  What is tolerable to the parties strengthens the 
system, even if the process does start to look like the ―I Love Lucy‖ candy 
factory assembly line. 
It must be stressed again, of course, that judges are permitted to move into 
this mode and occupy this decisional space only when the law permits it and 
when the parties and the judge think it will be helpful.  In short, the occasion 
 
11. Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1, 4 nn.14–15 (2007). 
12. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. CTS., 2008 JUDICIAL BUSINESS 13–14 (2009), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2008/JudicialBus2008.pdf. 
13. Id. at 38 tbl.12. 
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arises when the usual templates are not working and therefore something else 
seems to be called for.  But, when is that likely to happen?  Are there 
identifiable circumstances or reliable markers that judges and litigants and 
lawyers can rely on to signal when something more is needed from the judge? 
I think there are.  In fact, I think I can identify five situations that tend to 
push the trial judge beyond the usual forms of dispute resolution—five 
situations that call for some measure of decisional imagination in order to 
bring about a workable and just result.  These are things that most judges do 
intuitively, almost instinctively, but in the strict sense, when they move into 
this mode, they are moving outside the usual decisional paradigms. 
First are those cases in which a disconnect exists between the facts, the 
law, and the perceptions of the parties.  The facts go one direction, the law 
seems to go another direction, and the parties‘ expectations, even when they 
are on the same side in the litigation, are inconsistent and diffused.  If the 
parties could articulate their state of mind, which they can‘t, they would say, 
―We don‘t know what we want, but fix it.‖  In such a situation, the usual 
decisional templates will not take you to a simple, straightforward result. 
Let me give you an example.  A few years back, I was assigned an Eighth 
Amendment jail-conditions case which involved the Marion County Jail, the 
facility that serves Indianapolis, Indiana.  It is a large metropolitan jail, which 
had been subjected to many years of overcrowding, inadequate funding, 
substandard services to the inmates, and general deterioration of the structure.  
The conditions were very bad—one could clearly say, inhumane—and even a 
five-year-old could conclude that they were, in fact, unconstitutional. 
Now by the time I inherited that case, it had been on the docket of our 
court for nearly twenty years.  The parties, as well as the community and local 
government, had reached a complete stalemate in terms of how to go about 
correcting the unconstitutional conditions.  There were no public funds 
available to fix the place up or to build a new facility, nor was there any 
political will to do what was obviously required. 
Eighth Amendment law is both clear and fairly well settled.  When 
citizens are incarcerated, either as pretrial or post-trial detainees, they are 
entitled to have certain minimum rights protected, including the right to safe, 
secure, healthy surroundings.  The lawyers and this judge knew the law and 
knew that it was not being complied with.  There was no dispute over the 
court‘s finding of unconstitutional conditions. 
The problem was what to do about them.  How could a remedy be 
effected, especially in view of the fact that, as the lawsuit was framed, the 
only named defendant was the Marion County Sheriff?  While he was by far 
the most cooperative and willing sheriff who had held that office during the 
long history of this case, he was virtually powerless by himself to effect a 
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solution to the problems of overcrowding and inadequate dietary and health 
services and basic cleanliness.  Although the jail was nominally the sheriff‘s 
responsibility and the court had already ruled that it was being operated in an 
unconstitutional way, in fact, the poor sheriff did not have the power to turn 
away prisoners arrested by the police, taken into custody, and delivered to him 
for detention, nor did he have the power or money to build a new jail or open 
auxiliary facilities.  He also had zero capacity to allocate funds he hadn‘t been 
given in order to upgrade the food and maintenance at his jail.  But 
technically, since he was the only named defendant in the lawsuit, he was the 
only person whom the court could hold in contempt for all these failures. 
We held lots of hearings and lots of conferences among the lawyers, and I 
made periodic trips to the jail to see and smell for myself just how bad it was.  
But not until we decided to bring together all the primary players in local 
government, all the governmental officials who were, in the truest sense of the 
term, the real parties in interest, in an effort to elevate this mess to the point 
where it was being dealt with by those who could actually bring about a 
solution, did we begin to make headway. 
Now, that was the little flash of judicial imagination, if I may say so.  I 
had no power to summon all those people over to my court; I could only 
invite them and hope that somehow, based on my personal powers of 
persuasion, I could get everyone I needed to come sit around the conference 
table in my chambers all at one time to try to figure out what could be done.  
So, the presiding judge of the county courts was there, the member of the city 
council who served as chair of the criminal justice committee, the county 
auditor, the state prosecutor, and public defender, the county attorney, a 
representative from the Indiana Department of Corrections, our district‘s U.S. 
Marshal (who housed federal prisoners at the Marion County Jail), and 
finally, the sheriff and his jail commander and some other high-ranking 
members of his department.  Of course, the lawyers on the case were present, 
along with one highly interested newspaper reporter.  We essentially staged a 
political pow-wow.  Together, starting that day and extending over the course 
of approximately another year, we worked to find a way solve the problem. 
The key turned out to be large numbers of local arrestees who were being 
detained while they awaited their initial appearances.  If the pace of 
processing those arrestees were increased, then the numbers in the jail would 
drop dramatically.  In addition, the county was able to contract with a private 
jail to provide some extra beds and space.  So it was the local state court trial 
judges who led the way in devising procedures that kept people moving and 
finally resulted in detention for only the worst of each day‘s crop, and for that, 
those judges deserve great credit.  Those judges also were wonderfully 
creative and imaginative in devising an entirely new local system.  In the end, 
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after nearly twenty-five years, a consent decree was entered and the case was 
closed. 
Such a successful outcome would not have been achieved if only the usual 
litigation procedures had been pursued.  In fact, during all the time that the 
usual procedures had been followed, they had completely failed.  Was what 
we did judicial activism?  Probably.  Was it necessary?  I think so.  Was it 
defensible?  Yes, and it was defensible in my opinion because we were careful 
to stay within the boundaries of proper judicial discretion and we did not 
ultimately exceed our lawful powers.  Between the time of the finding of 
unconstitutional conditions and the subsequent finding that the sheriff was in 
contempt of that order, until the end when I entered the final consent decree, 
interestingly enough, I never issued a single other order beyond scheduling 
orders.  And no appeal was ever taken. 
The second kind of case in which this kind of judicial imagination is 
especially valuable occurs when the goals of the parties involved in the 
litigation extend beyond both the four corners of their case and the 
traditionally available remedies.  This situation arises most often and most 
clearly with requests for injunctive relief.  It also arises where a single 
violation of law, once it has been established as such, requires a more 
expansive remedy. 
For example, a construction contractor operating as a sole proprietor fails 
to withhold and pay over the monies to cover union benefits for his handful of 
employees.  The union then sues to get the monies and to pay them into their 
members‘ welfare and benefits fund.  The suit is technically filed to recover 
the overdue payments, but what the union really wants is to get the contractor 
back on schedule for future payments.  When these cases arise, the judge 
often has to sit down with both sides to see what arrangements can be made, 
given the realities of, let‘s say, the seasonal nature of the contractor‘s business 
or other such problems the guy is having with his business.  So the judge tries 
to find out if there are any other arrearages and what his income stream looks 
like.  These are essentially mediations, of course, but they are strongly 
affected by two factors: first, the raw, lurking power of the court to impose an 
unknown but possibly very unpleasant, top-down decision, if the parties don‘t 
get real, and second, the capacity of the court to recognize or suggest 
intelligent, practical solutions—in other words, to exercise good ―judicial 
imagination.‖  It‘s that exercise that brings things back into balance. 
I was the United States Attorney in Indianapolis years ago, when the air 
traffic controllers went on strike.  The Department of Justice chose our district 
to file its request for an injunction requiring the controllers to cease their 
illegal strike and return to work.  The judge issued the order, but no one 
complied with it, as is always a danger in large labor or other social actions.  
The air traffic controllers continued to stay away from work, and they busied 
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their days with demonstrations and press conferences.  They decorated their 
cars with placards and would drive them in single-line formation, caravan 
style, around and around the control tower.  As an easily enforceable 
contempt sanction, the judge then ordered each controller to surrender one 
automobile, which vehicle was to be impounded by the U.S. Marshal for as 
long as the strike continued.  This instantly created a large number of single-
car families and a very large number of unhappy spouses and restive teenage 
children.  In Indiana, where driving a car is regarded as a fundamental right, it 
was one of the most effective and imaginative contempt sanctions I have ever 
witnessed, both enforceable and creatively painful, and when the many 
spouses started complaining directly to the court about the gross unfairness of 
this order, we knew the strike was about to peter out. 
Now this was not just imaginative, and it does not make for just a good 
story.  The context, after all, is one in which direct judicial power failed.  The 
court itself, using the normal tools, was in danger of being perceived as 
impotent.  And it was in the face of this abyss that a savvy old judge came up 
with a sideways thrust that let everybody know the law was still there, and 
that it works. 
We have been discussing the category of cases in which ―judicial 
imagination‖ becomes valuable because the goals in some significant way 
extend beyond the four corners of the case or beyond the usually available 
remedies.  Nowhere can you see this better than at a criminal sentencing 
hearing.  The sentence should, of course, be just, reasonable, and fair, but also 
folded into that sentencing is the attempt to deter such offenses in the future 
(not only by the defendant but by others as well).  Very often there is also a 
strong need for rehabilitation.  This mix requires almost every time a huge 
amount of judicial imagination—of what used to be called ―wisdom‖—and 
the best judges I have known have been perceptive enough and flexible 
enough to fashion appropriately imaginative sentences, including very 
carefully crafted terms of probation or supervised release as well as 
considerable jail time. 
There was, I think, a fundamental policy error in the prior federal-
sentencing-guidelines regimen which we had in place until recently: the one-
size-fits-all decisional straitjacket that was placed on judges‘ discretion 
removed the opportunity for handcrafted outcomes and substituted for 
intelligence a kind of blind mechanical fate.  There are large issues of value 
and philosophy mixed into this, of course, but from the bench what I saw were 
also serious practical problems.  In particular, I recall instances in which 
sentences were meted out and not a single person in the courtroom—not the 
prosecutor, not the defense counsel, not the judge, and certainly not the 
defendant or her family—felt that the sentence was just.  In short, removing 
judicial imagination entirely from the criminal sentencing process debased our 
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system of justice; in practical terms, it led to outright disrespect both for the 
law and the result. 
The third circumstance in which judges must be particularly imaginative 
is when they deal with the proverbial ―Big Cases.‖  By ―big case,‖ I mean 
class actions and multidistrict litigation brought under antitrust, patent, or 
securities law as well as those brought under mass-tort and product-liability 
theories.  These cases almost always entail complicated and complex case 
management procedures.  Just getting the parties identified and organized, the 
legal issues framed, and the relevant evidence collected—these are huge, 
time-consuming tasks.  A judge who, with imagination and experience and 
judgment, can noodle these things out and move the case ahead provides great 
service to the parties and to the public.  The judicial role here is to guide the 
process, while being careful not to usurp the parties‘ prerogatives in shaping, 
and hopefully resolving, their litigation.  But in performing that critical role, 
the judge most often moves out onto a tree limb armed only with personal 
insight and accumulated understanding.  There is almost no practical 
instruction or guidance that can be found in case law, statutes, or the rules of 
procedure.  And in these cases, the case-management challenges very often 
outweigh the difficulties of resolving the mere legal merits. 
Almost nine years ago, I was assigned the Ford-Firestone tire case.  As 
you may recall, that was a product-liability multidistrict litigation.  It arose out 
of allegations that Firestone had manufactured defective tires and that Ford 
had then installed them on vehicles improperly.  All told, approximately 800 
separate personal injury cases were filed: they came not only from around the 
United States, but also from several foreign jurisdictions.  In addition, two 
accompanying product liability class actions were filed as original matters in 
my court and became part of the multidistrict litigation.  Our first and biggest 
task was simply to organize the parties and the cases.  We—and by this I 
don‘t mean the royal ―we,‖ but a whole team: myself, a magistrate judge, a 
special master, a courtroom deputy clerk, and my law clerks, plus a few more 
I shanghaied into helping us—created committees of lawyers; we developed a 
separate docket control system and website; we structured and oversaw the 
discovery process and added a procedure to resolve discovery disputes 
promptly; we consolidated and scheduled the motions briefings and all related 
submissions; we conducted pretrial conferences, telephone conferences, and 
courtroom hearings as if they were repeating seasonal festivals; and, finally, 
we had literally hundreds of separate settlement conferences.  Each legal 
decision we made on the pretrial motions was, of course, appealed to the 
Seventh Circuit, but the process barreled on; we never had the luxury of 
waiting for an appellate decision before moving ahead with the next steps.  It 
was the trial-court version of crowd control at Disneyland. 
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At every juncture in this Big Case, we were on our own in terms of 
developing and executing a strategy.  Beyond the Manual for Complex 
Litigation, there were no templates.  We made it up as we went.  Was that 
judicial activism?  Some people might call it that.  But did it work?  And more 
importantly, did it prevent our federal judicial system in this high-profile 
instance from collapsing into a diffuse arbitrariness that would have caused 
people to lose faith in what we were doing?  I believe so.  After nine years, I 
have today approximately ten of these Ford-Firestone cases still pending, all 
of which were only recent referrals to my docket by the MDL panel, so those 
came to us well after the vast majority of the original cases had been resolved.  
Most of those resolutions, you may be interested to know, came through 
negotiated settlement conferences or court-ordered dismissals on procedural 
grounds. 
There are two final situations I will touch on only briefly as I round out 
my five sets of circumstances in which a premium is placed on the trial 
judge‘s discretionary powers and judicial imagination.  Number four occurs 
when judges find it necessary to exercise the contempt powers—in other 
words, either to punish or correct conduct that disrupts or threatens to disrupt 
the court proceedings, or to sanction offenders when the court‘s orders have 
been violated.  I can tell you from troublesome, first-hand experience that 
these often ticklish, sometimes volatile occasions call for judicial discretion a 
la mode.  The judge here acts only to vindicate the court‘s authority, so 
whatever sanctions are imposed have to be surgical: the aim is to secure 
compliance with previously issued court orders or to right the behavioral 
balance among the participants in open court, but go no further.  The law says 
what a judge can do in these circumstances, but not how to do it.  There is a 
great deal both emotionally and intellectually at play here.  What language 
does the judge use?  What tone does the judge employ?  Precisely how has the 
offending conduct played out in the presence of the court—how did it impede 
or disrupt the proceedings?  How exactly should the response be crafted?  The 
only effective guides on which a judge can reliably draw in dealing with 
contempt are a strong sense of self-restraint coupled with the creativity to 
craft a response that is, as the Goldilocks story put it, ―not too hot, not too 
cold, just right.‖  The object, after all, is de-escalation with compliance, as 
opposed to carpet bombing for the sheer fun of it. 
Fifth and finally, a special need for judicial imagination arises in public 
and political cases.  Often these cases come in surrounded by a storm—the 
issues are charged and subject to hot public debate.  This means that beyond 
the need to articulate a legal analysis carefully and to apply the law properly, 
the judge must somehow also grapple with a serious extra-legal imperative: 
the need to bring the public along—the need to give the public a clearer, fuller 
picture of the legal dimensions of the dispute.  Often, when the media have 
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distorted or have failed themselves to understand the true nature of the legal 
issues, the court needs to play an educational role as well as a decisional one.  
Election-law cases and voting disputes are good examples here.  First 
Amendment speech and religion cases, excessive-force or search-and-seizure 
issues, governmental regulation of various benefit programs such as 
Medicaid, school-law and education-related conflicts, jail-conditions cases—
all of these can provoke free-floating, needlessly unbalanced public reaction.  
If we are to maintain basic respect for the judicial system, not to mention the 
rule of law, the courts in these types of cases need considerable latitude—
discretionary space—for ad hoc adjustments that technically extend beyond 
the mere legal merits. 
Thus, it has been my practice to schedule oral arguments on motions for 
summary judgment in these kinds of cases, in part to allow the public to have 
a window into the arguments and counter-arguments involved in the case.  
When a case needs to be decided according to a larger timetable, such as the 
effective date of the statute under review or prior to an election deadline, I do 
what I need to do to get my ruling out in a timely fashion, which includes time 
for an appeal as well.  Whether to allow the filing of amicus briefs and by 
whom are also decisions that crop up in public and political cases and are 
entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial judge. 
Now let me at least try to bring all of this together.  Jerome Frank, the 
prominent Second Circuit judge and legal-realist scholar, some eighty years 
ago wrote something that accurately reflects the facts of life then and now, but 
that also admits a symptom of dis-ease, a state of unhealthiness about the 
judicial process: ―[J]ustice,‖ he said, ―depends on a creative judiciary.  But the 
compulsion to make appearances deny the fact of judicial innovation and 
individualization means that the most important task of the judge must be 
done in a sneaking, hole-in-corner manner.  The judicial genius must do his 
work on the sly . . . .‖14 
In this lecture this evening, in an effort to demonstrate the way trial judges 
think and what trial judges are tasked with doing, I admittedly have used a 
variety of terms which I have left undefined: judicial imagination, discretion, 
wise discretion (which, of course, also implies unwise discretion), decisional 
gap, creativity, activism.  I‘ve also drawn upon some of Judge Posner‘s terms: 
―legislation,‖ ―open area,‖ and so forth.  The lack of definition by me is 
intentional because it is significant.  It reflects very accurately the current 
state of affairs when it comes to the process of judicial decision making—
practical necessity combined with theoretical confusion—and that 
combination can create the uncomfortable feeling of sneaking around. 
 
14. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 152 (Transaction Publishing 2008) (1930). 
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You can see this situation in the five examples I have described for you of 
imaginative adjudication in the federal district courts.  All of the cases, all of 
these situations, move the district court judge into decisional territory in 
which the usual props and guy wires are absent.  This is Judge Posner‘s ―open 
area‖ of judicial decision-making.  At the appellate level, the judge, as a 
―constrained pragmatist,‖ to use another of his terms, enjoys a certain amount 
of permission to ―legislate,‖ or at least to reduce to specific words in a public, 
innovative, enforceable document, a workable and just result.
15
 
But the problems facing the district court are usually quite different.  
There, it is not so much a matter of judicial ―legislation‖; there, the 
requirement is more for what I have called judicial ―imagination.‖  As I have 
tried to make clear, there is a vast array of circumstances in which trial judges 
must problem-solve where the only resources they have to draw upon are their 
own sense of judicial discretion and their own judicial creativity.  The usual 
guides—statutes, precedents, regulations, the Constitution, even well-
established common-law principles—are missing in action.  The judge 
appears to be standing out there on some hill all alone, surrounded by the fog 
and din of battle, doing the best he or she can under the circumstances. 
But here is the point I want to make: standing alone does not mean 
standing alone and free.  Even when the trial judge acts in the ―open area,‖ 
there are true constraints on her decisional powers.  When the usual or 
traditional guy wires disappear from the process, that does not mean that the 
judge floats off into outer space.  Like astronauts performing their space 
walks far beyond earth‘s gravitational pull, judges too remain tethered to the 
mother ship if they hope to survive the experience.  The notion that there is 
some area of complete decisional freedom where judges are permitted to act 
out their libertine subjective preferences is a silly and uninformed illusion. 
So what are the constraints on trial judges when they exercise these 
discretionary powers?  Certainly, the most important one is the rule of law, 
which provides the fundamental backdrop.  This is, after all, a legal process, 
not political science or sociology or even economics (I say with particular 
deference to Judge Posner).  The trial judge‘s actions have to conform to the 
rule of law, but also have to pass muster with the parties and the public and 
the appellate panels.  I would put these latter requirements loosely in a 
category called ―cultural restraints.‖  It would not pass muster at a contempt 
hearing, for example, if I took off my shoe and threw it dramatically at the 
offender as an expression of judicial disrespect. 
Besides cultural restraints, there are also important practical parameters: 
the actions taken by a judge have to be enforceable—they have to work, to be 
 
15. POSNER, supra note 1, at 13. 
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realistic and within the reach of the court‘s actual powers.  The people on the 
receiving end of the court‘s orders have to know precisely what they are being 
required to do, and if they don‘t do it voluntarily, the trial judge has to be able 
to make them do it, often with the help of the United States Marshal.  Finally, 
not only do the exercises of discretion and imagination in the trial court have 
to be legal, practical, and within cultural norms, they have to stay within the 
four corners of the case before the court—they have to be about the particular 
problems the court is being asked to solve.  They are, what I would call, ―case 
dependent.‖ 
Let me conclude, then, with what I hope you will receive as some 
challenges that arise from the (admittedly one-sided) discussion we have been 
having here.  We know for a fact, despite the polarizing views about judicial 
activism, as well as the charges of judicial activism that get levied at certain 
judges and certain decisions, most of which clearly fall wide of the mark, that 
no judicial system can exist in good health and function well or be long 
supported by the public without there being substantial space for judicial 
discretion.  We know that, without judicial discretion, the American judiciary 
would degenerate slowly into one more example of unresponsive and 
generally impotent bureaucracy.  Indeed, you can see evidence of this in 
certain other judicial systems around the world.  We know that the exercise of 
discretion is far more constrained than casual glance would perceive it to be.  
And yet we also know that, as critical a role as discretion or imagination plays 
in the decisional process, it continues, sometimes even within the judiciary 
but certainly outside it, to be dogged by the sense that what is going on is 
furtive and sneaky and not fully legitimate. 
So here are my challenges to you: could those of you who are law 
professors focus more scholarly attention on the actual operation of creative, 
legitimate judicial discretion—the need for it as well as the invisible 
constraints upon it?  We not only need honest, open recognition of this 
sustaining and often life-giving function, but also some well-founded 
scholarly attention given to theories of creative discretion which are 
predicated on the real necessities that drive it.  Perhaps you could focus on 
―best practices‖ in this area of judicial decision-making; but to find them and 
recognize them as such, you will have to get underneath the case law to see 
what is really going on.  During class discussions with your students, perhaps 
you could focus their attentions now and then on the ―open spaces‖ that are 
presented to judges as decisional opportunities, discussing with them the 
creative, discretionary options that are, or are not, available to fill those 
spaces, including why judges and lawyers should or should not go in certain 
directions in certain situations.  That would provide students with at least a 
rudimentary vision of what a creative and fully functioning judiciary looks 
like. 
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As for those of you who are practicing attorneys, perhaps you could, with 
greater intentionality, help spot those spaces and help fill them by suggesting 
ways to the judges that their discretion could be more effectively exercised.  
Some of the most successful discretionary strokes I have made during my 
career have been made in consultation—indeed, virtually in tandem—with 
highly creative lawyers who were appearing before me. 
Next to last, let me suggest that law schools devote some thought and 
attention to finding ways to develop continuing-education curricula for judges 
on this subject.  Remember, we are talking here about underground matters—
things buried in reticence—and the primary way judges now learn about them 
is through on-the-job training (you might say ―trial and error‖). 
Finally, let me express my strong hope that all of us who share this calling 
to be members of the legal profession look for and use whatever opportunities 
present themselves—some which will no doubt be modest, some more 
substantial and conspicuous—to help the public understand that in the long 
run, judicial imagination—properly shaped and properly grounded and 
properly exercised—is very much in the public interest.  This is the biggest 
challenge of all, of course, but without some success on this front, the risk is 
that much of what is best and most valuable about our system of justice will 
fall victim to the lack of public understanding and public acceptance. 
I want to say again in closing what a great honor it has been for me to be 
with you this evening and to have the opportunity to talk about serious things.  
Thank you very much. 
